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Intent to Charge for Unsolicited Benefits
Conferred in an Emergency: A Case Study in
the Meaning of "Unjust" in the Restatement
(Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment
Louis E. Wolcher*
Abstract
This Article is a legal and jurisprudential case study that attempts to
shed light on the use of the word "unjust" in the law of restitution as it has
been reinterpreted by the new Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust
Enrichment. The particular case studied is the legal meaning of the term
"intent to charge" in the law’s treatment of claims for unsolicited benefits
conferred in emergencies. The author conducts a thought experiment
involving the use of a sworn "Declaration of Intent to Charge for Benefits
Conferred" to illustrate certain ambiguities and difficulties in the way the
new Restatement deals with this legal category. The Article exploits the
thought experiment and the difficulties it uncovers in order to advance the
author’s primary purpose, which is to retrieve dialectically a certain
necessary independence for the idea of justice in the development of the
substantive law of unjust enrichment.
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I. Introduction: The Third Restatement in Historical Context
The curriculum of most modern American law schools relegates the
law of restitution to the status of a bonbon, so to speak, to be served in other
courses at the discretion of the instructor: A sort of exotic hors d’oeuvre or
after-dinner mint in classes where the real meat-and-potatoes consists of
contracts, torts, or remedies.1 But while our law schools may have slighted
this area of the law, the courts never have. As Professor Hanoch Dagan has
said, "While restitution receded from the American academic landscape and
was marginalized in the law school curriculum, courts continued to develop
the doctrine, facing new problems and refining the rules dealing with
benefits-based civil liability."2 Thanks to the herculean efforts of Professor
Andrew Kull and his diligent band of advisers, the American Law Institute
has at last delivered us the text of a brand new Restatement (Third) of
It is a monumental
Restitution & Unjust Enrichment (R3RUE).3
achievement. Thankfully, this text manages to take account of many of the
new developments to which Dagan refers that have intervened in American
private law litigation since 1936,4 when the First Restatement was
completed,5 and 1984, when the uncompleted Second Restatement issued
its second (and last) tentative draft.6 Whatever impact the new Restatement
may have on the future development of the law of restitution, I believe (and
hope) that its completion and publication will encourage legal academics to
1. See HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 1 (2004) ("Only a bare
handful of American law schools offer a restitution course these days, and few academics
write in this area. Restitution was subsumed under the general category of remedies or
dissipated into the interstices of property, torts, and contract.").
2. Id. at 328.
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011).
4. See, e.g., DAGAN, supra note 1, at 3 ("John Langbein analyzes this unfortunate
development as part of the ‘terrible toll that the realist movement has inflicted on doctrinal
study.’").
5. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (1937) [hereinafter FIRST RESTATEMENT].
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1984)
[hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT].
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give more visibility in the law school curriculum to this important but much
neglected subject.
Although a Reporter’s Note to the new Restatement states that the
taxonomy of "the present Restatement follows the 1937 Restatement
without apology,"7 the ALI’s official website also declares that the project’s
name, which includes the words "restitution" and "unjust enrichment,"
restores the originally conceived title of the First Restatement as a way of
emphasizing the fact that "the subject matter encompasses the independent
body of law of unjust enrichment, and not simply the remedy of
restitution."8 The R3RUE, by loudly proclaiming the inadequately
understood legal point that restitutionary remedies are not the same as the
substantive law of unjust enrichment, affirmatively invites judges, lawyers
and legal academics to address the important question posed by Professor
Douglas Laycock several years ago: "What is it that makes enrichment
unjust in the absence of some wrong for which the law would impose
damage liability?"9
I have taught a stand-alone class on restitution and unjust enrichment
at regular intervals throughout my academic career. I first learned about the
subject at the feet of the great Jack Dawson, whose work in the field still
remains very important,10 and who, together with George Palmer, wrote a
superb casebook on the subject that has, alas, been out of print for a very
long time.11 As someone who philosophizes a lot about legal themes, the
main reason I enjoy teaching this subject so much is that its principal
organizing concept contains the word "unjust." This word appears to bring
the concept of justice (as opposed to mere lawfulness) directly into the legal
arena, thereby confounding (or at least complicating) the distinction
between legal positivism and natural law theory. The very first section of
the R3RUE states: "A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 reporter’s
note a (2011).
8. Restatement Third, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, AM. LAW INST.,
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=14 (last visited Oct. 5,
2011).
9. Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV.
1277, 1285 (1989).
10. See, e.g., JOHN P. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
(1951) [hereinafter UNJUST ENRICHMENT]; John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1974).
11. JOHN P. DAWSON & GEORGE E. PALMER, CASES ON RESTITUTION (2d ed. 1969).
The other leading casebook on restitution, JOHN W. WADE, RESTITUTION: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2d. ed. 1966), is also out of print.

914

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 911 (2011)

another is subject to liability in restitution." 12 The theme of justice shows
itself in this formulation because the dyad "unjust enrichment" seems to
name a state of affairs—injustice—that judges applying the law of
restitution are supposed to pay attention to and care about.
In America, at least, the law of restitution did not begin to be
recognized as a separate discipline, displaying its own internal patterns of
thought crossing the formal doctrinal boundaries of tort and contract, until
the end of the nineteenth century, with the publication of A Treatise on the
Law of Quasi-Contracts by Dean William Keener of the Columbia Law
School.13 But, of course, the grand principle that no one should be enriched
at another’s expense is of ancient origin. Aristotle spoke of it,14 as did the
second-century Roman jurist, Pomponius, who famously remarked that
"this by nature is equitable, that no one be made richer through another’s
loss."15 The principle is said to rest on the aggravation to our sense of
injustice that is felt whenever someone’s loss is accompanied by someone
else’s corresponding unwarranted gain.16 According to Professor Dawson,
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011). The
corresponding language in Section 1 of the First Restatement reads, "A person who has been
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other." The
Second Restatement’s version of this topic’s organizing principle was rather less elegant:
"A person who receives a benefit by reason of an infringement of another person’s interest,
or of loss suffered by the other, owes restitution to him in the manner and amount necessary
to prevent unjust enrichment." SECOND RESTATEMENT § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983).
13. WILLIAM KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS (1893).
Professor Dawson claimed that Keener’s treatise represents the first recognition in print of
the many "interconnections" linking the various topics of restitution. DAWSON, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 21. The Introduction to the Second Restatement, on the
other hand, asserts that "[t]he common elements of claims now called restitutionary were not
widely perceived until well into [the twentieth] century." Introduction to RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF RESTITUTION (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983).
14. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1131b32—1132a14, in 2 JONATHAN BARNES, ED.,
THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1786 (1984).
[T]he law looks only at the distinctive character of the injury, and treats the
parties as equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged . . . the
suffering and the action have been unequally distributed; but the judge tries to
equalize things by means of the penalty, taking away from the gain of the
assailant.
Id.
15. DIG. 50.17.206 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18).
16. Professor Dawson, for example, wrote that the principle against unjust enrichment
is almost instinctual, an "aspiration [that] lies deep in human nature." DAWSON, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 5. Others have articulated this human aspiration in
quantitative terms, claiming that the combination of the plaintiff’s loss and the defendant’s
gain makes the plaintiff’s claim in restitution "twice" as impressive to our sense of justice.
Lon Fuller & William Purdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 40 YALE L.J. 52,
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it responds to "one of the basic questions of distributive justice,"17 and in its
purest form it may even lie at the heart of Marx’s theory of exploitation.18
Any doctrine that is as broadly and vaguely worded as this one
promises to be extremely hard to translate into a system of legal rules,
which is why Professor Dawson called the prohibition against unjust
enrichment a "working hypothesis" rather than a definitive legal rule.19 The
First Restatement, in its initial "General Scope Note," took the same point
of view.20
Notwithstanding the admittedly Delphic quality of the term "unjust
enrichment," however, I like to remind my restitution students that it is
quite rare in American law for the J-word ("justice") to show up explicitly
in legal doctrine, even if only in the form of what the First Restatement
calls a "general guide[] for the conduct of the courts."21 I also encourage
my students to seize the opportunity for serious independent thinking (as
distinguished from mere learning) that is afforded by the circumstance that
the J-word actually does show up in this particular subject. Whenever a
judicial decision draws a line, and then proceeds to justify it by saying that
on this side stands something like justice (i.e., the imperative to rectify
unjust enrichment), I say that this gives law students a rare opportunity to
think critically about the moral premises of the judgments that our courts
make every day. Critical thinking about the normative premises of the legal
system also can help keep alive in law students the belief that the idea of
justice as such, however one defines it, can be a criterion—or at least a
trigger—for the ethically important task of evaluating what lawyers and
judges do to other people in the name of what is merely legal or legally
valid.

56 (1936).
17. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 5.
18. Id. at 40 (referring to Marx’s theory that the wage bargain unjustly permits the
capitalist to pay less for the use of workers’ labor power than the value of the marginal
product of their labor).
19. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 10, at 26.
20. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION pt. I, ch. 1, topic 1, intro. note (1937) ("In this
Topic, these are stated in the form of principles. They cannot be stated as rules since either
they are too indefinite to be of value in a specific case or, for historical or other reasons, they
are not universally applied.").
21. Id.
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II. The Distinction Between Unjust and Unjustified Enrichment

Seen from the foregoing point of view, the R3RUE’s commentary on
the concept of "unjust enrichment" proves to be somewhat disappointing.
To be sure, the commentary does gesture at the role of justice as a possible
meta-criterion for the substantive law of unjust enrichment, but it appears to
do so rather grudgingly. Moreover, what it gives with one hand, it takes
away with the other. The key text is Section 1’s Comment b, entitled
"Unjust Enrichment." Immediately after stating that "[t]he substantive part
of the law of restitution is concerned with identifying those forms of
enrichment that the law treats as ‘unjust’ for purposes of imposing
liability,"22 the comment uses what can only be called a quasi-sociological
tone in describing the views of those thinkers who believe there is a
"special moral attractiveness" to the law of restitution:
A significant tradition within English and American law refers to unjust
enrichment as if it were something identifiable a priori, by the exercise
of a moral judgment anterior to legal rules. This equitable conception of
the law of restitution is crystallized by Lord Mansfield’s famous
statement in Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1012, 97 Eng. Rep. 676,
681 (K.B. 1760): "In one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that the
defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of
natural justice and equity to refund the money." Explaining restitution
as the embodiment of natural justice and equity gives the subject an
undoubted versatility, an adaptability to new situations, and (in the eyes
of many observers) a special moral attractiveness. Restitution in this
view is the aspect of our legal system that makes the most direct appeal
to standards of equitable and conscientious behavior as a source of
enforceable obligations.23

Having thus dutifully reported what "many observers" believe, the
remainder of the comment pulls no punches in stating what the drafters of
the new Restatement themselves really think the meaning of the word
"unjust" should be. And it would not be unfair, I believe, to characterize
the expression of what they really think on this question as manifesting a
particularly severe, if not puritanical, form of legal positivism:
The concern of restitution is not, in fact, with unjust enrichment in any
such broad sense, but with a narrower set of circumstances giving rise to
what might more appropriately be called unjustified enrichment.
Compared to the open-ended implications of the term "unjust
enrichment," instances of unjustified enrichment are both predictable
22.
23.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (2011).
Id.
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and objectively determined, because the justification in question is not
moral but legal. Unjustified enrichment is enrichment that lacks an
adequate legal basis; it results from a transaction that the law treats as
ineffective to work a conclusive alteration in ownership rights. . . .
Because of its greater explanatory power, the term unjustified
enrichment might thus be preferred to unjust enrichment, were it not for
the established usage imposed by the first Restatement of Restitution.
But while the choice between the two expressions may indicate a
preferred vantage point, it implies no difference in legal outcomes. As
descriptions of the circumstances that give rise to legal liability, the
terms unjust enrichment and unjustified enrichment are precisely
coextensive, identifying the same transactions and the same legal
relationships. This is because—notwithstanding the potential reach of
the words, and Lord Mansfield’s confident reference to "natural
justice"—the circumstances in which American law has in fact
identified an unjust enrichment resulting in legal liability have been
those and only those in which there might also be said to be unjustified
enrichment, meaning the transfer of a benefit without adequate legal
ground.24

If this passage means to assert that in every instance in which
American courts have awarded a remedy in restitution they have relied on a
well-established antecedent legal basis for concluding that the defendant’s
enrichment was unjust, then I submit that it is an overstatement, to say the
least. Consider Bron v. Weintraub,25 for example, in which the Supreme
Court of New Jersey used the principle (but not the "rule") of unjust
enrichment to impose a constructive trust on title to real estate that the
defendants had acquired in a lawful but highly inequitable manner.26
Stating that "public policy is more than a mere summation of its past
applications," the court quoted the following statement with approval:
Sometimes . . . public policy is declared by Constitution; sometimes by
statute; sometimes by judicial decision. More often, however, it abides
only in the customs and conventions of the people—in their clear
consciousness and conviction of what is naturally and inherently just
and right between man and man. . . . When a course of conduct is cruel
24. Id.
25. Bron v. Weintraub, 199 A.2d 625, 625 (N.J. 1964).
26. Id. The defendants had purchased for a song the right to redeem title to real estate
that had been sold decades before for non-payment of taxes, and then subsequently
developed into residences that were resold to the innocent plaintiff-householders. The court
stated explicitly that it did not rest its decision imposing a constructive trust on account of
the defendants’ unjust enrichment on the theory that they had acquired title fraudulently, or,
for that matter, on any other theory of positive law outside the principle of unjust
enrichment. Id. at 627.
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or shocking to the average man’s conception of justice, such course of
conduct must be held to be obviously contrary to public policy, even
though such policy has never been so written in the bond, whether it be
Constitution, statute, or decree of court.27

Not only did the Bron court declare the independence of the principle of
unjust enrichment from all traditional sources of positive law, it actually
applied the principle to the case before it. Finding "no social value or
contribution" in what the defendants did when, like any good capitalists,
they used the resources of the law and the marketplace to enrich themselves
at the expense of the plaintiffs, the court remarked: "On the contrary,
decent men must sense only revulsion in this traffic in the misfortune of
others."28 It is impossible to find in the Bron decision any judicial
awareness of a discretion-constraining antecedent "legal basis," as
Comment b puts it, that would make the outcome "both predictable and
objectively determined, because the justification in question is not moral
but legal." 29 The very existence of decisions such as Bron underscores the
danger to courts and scholars of falling into what Professor Dagan calls "the
positivist trap of unjustified enrichment,"30 where the desire to equate
unjust enrichment with legally unjustified enrichment can result in an
"unwarranted simplification of this complex and diversified body of law."31
Putting all questions of its descriptive accuracy aside, however, the
way this comment describes the concept of unjust (as opposed to
unjustified) enrichment reflects what appears to be an extremely narrow
view of the judicial process. In criticizing the idea of a "purely equitable
account of the subject," the comment states:
Saying that liability in restitution is imposed to avoid unjust enrichment
effectively postpones the real work of definition, leaving to a separate
inquiry the question whether a particular transaction is productive of
unjust enrichment or not. In numerous cases natural justice and equity
do not in fact provide an adequate guide to decision, and would not do
so even if their essential requirements could be treated as self-evident.
Unless a definition of restitution can provide a more informative
generalization about the nature of transactions leading to liability, it is
difficult to avoid the objection that sees in "unjust enrichment," at best, a

27. Id. at 628 (quoting Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Kinney, 115 N.E. 505, 506
(Ohio 1916)).
28. Id. at 630.
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (2011).
30. DAGAN, supra note 1, at 18.
31. Id. at 25.
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name for a legal conclusion that remains to be explained; at worst, an
open-ended and potentially unprincipled charter of liability.32

When this passage is read together with the balance of Comment b, its
logical premise seems to be that the legal system is required to choose
between two, and only two, possibilities. First possibility: The law can
have clearly articulated antecedent rules that implement the specific
policies of each area of restitution without the need for some overarching
principle of maddening vagueness to "guide" the courts in the way the First
Restatement said they should be guided. Second possibility: The law can
allow individual judges to gather wool from some Cloud Cuckoo Land33 of
personal morality where "something identifiable a priori" outside of
positive law lets them know what is just and unjust in any given case. What
is more, it is quite clear from the tenor of Comment b that the drafters of the
R3RUE wholeheartedly embrace the first possibility, and reject the second.
They attempt to remove the fangs of the term "unjust enrichment" as a
separate criterion of judgment by declaring that unjust enrichment and
legally unjustified enrichment are "precisely coextensive," and "[i]n no
instance does the fact or extent of liability in restitution depend on whether
the source of that liability is conceived or described as unjust enrichment,
as unjustified enrichment, or as a combination of the two."34 In this last
passage, the drafters do not just attempt to exorcise the ghost of natural law
theory from the R3RUE—they also express a particularly acute form of
legal nominalism: That is, they warn judges against relying too much (or at
all) on the J-word in any of its forms.35 They seem to be saying that it is not
the words "unjust enrichment" or even the neologism "unjustified
enrichment" that matter but, rather, whether the plaintiff’s claim has "an
adequate legal basis" that derives from some other, more particularized,
section of the Restatement.
It is important to understand that the matter at stake in this struggle for
the soul of unjust enrichment is not, or at least not only, the question of
whether the law of restitution should be cast in the form of precise legal
rules or loosey-goosey legal standards.36 There are plenty of both kinds of
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (2011).
33. See Aristophanes, The Birds, in 2 THE COMPLETE GREEK DRAMA 733 (Whitney
Oates & Eugene O’Neill eds., 1938) (explaining that ȃİĳİȜȠțȠțțȣȖȓĮ, or "Cloud Cuckoo
Land," is supposed to be a perfect city in the sky that the protagonists in Aristophanes’
comedy hope to erect).
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (2011).
35. Id.
36. The best discussion of this important distinction in the form of legal norms is
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legal norms in the new Restatement.37 Nor is the heart of the matter to be
found in Ronald Dworkin’s analytic distinction between legal rules, which
"set out legal consequences that follow automatically when the conditions
provided are met," and legal principles, which do not predict consequences
in advance but nonetheless possess a "dimension of weight or importance"
in the legal system.38
I do not think that what is most at stake in the matter of the meaning of
"unjust enrichment" is the same as the question of what antecedent form or
content the law should give to the legal norms that judges apply in
restitution cases. If we insist on thinking of the concept unjust enrichment
as a vessel that must contain some sort of a priori content or institutional
history before it is applied (whether in the form of a vague "standard" or a
"principle"), then the dilemma that the drafters of the R3RUE have
expressed in Comment b appears quite compelling. Adhering to the
container view of legal norms makes it appear that we have to choose
between radical nominalism and radical realism. That is, we can have
either a sturdy but empty vessel that merely captures the real content of
other, more precise legal rules and standards in the Restatement or a leaky
vessel full of idiosyncratic notions of justice and injustice that derive their
content from God-knows-where. If that is our only choice, then I believe
that what Lon Fuller said about the Catholic tradition of natural law
found in Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1685 (1976).
37. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 56
(2011) (describing the standard-like norm for imposing an equitable lien), with id. § 59
(describing the relatively more mechanical and hence rule-like norm for tracing).
38. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 25–26 (1977). I daresay that
Dworkin himself would probably not be happy with the R3RUE’s decision to deprive the
principle of unjust enrichment of any independent jurisprudential weight. Dworkin
expresses the view that the saying "no man may profit from his own wrong" expresses an
important legal "principle" even if it does not amount to a legal "rule":
We say that our law respects the principle that no man may profit from his own
wrong, but we do not mean that the law never permits a man to profit from
wrongs he commits. In fact, people often profit, perfectly legally, from their
legal wrongs. The most notorious case is adverse possession—if I trespass on
your land long enough, some day I will gain a right to cross your land whenever
I please. . . . We do not treat these [sorts of cases] as showing that the principle
about profiting from one’s wrongs is not a principle of our legal system, or that
it is incomplete and needs qualifying exceptions. . . . All that is meant, when we
say that a particular principle is a principle of our law, is that the principle is one
which officials must take into account, if it is relevant, as a consideration
inclining in one direction or another.
Id.
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thinking applies with equal force to the present situation—the quest for a
"higher law" of divine or human justice to fill a positive legal vessel before
it is applied is really just another form of positivism.39 Pre-existing law
posited by explicit micro-rules declared in advance or pre-existing law
posited by judges’ case-by-case interpretations of the general principle of
unjust enrichment—either way of imagining how the legal system works—
leads inevitably to what John Chipman Gray called "the absurdity of the
view of Law preexistent to its declaration."40
Fortunately, this is not our only choice. Traditional theories of legal
positivism and natural law tend to presuppose that a legal or moral concept
has a "content" that remains identical with itself throughout at least some
length of time.41 That is, they presuppose that one can "lay down the law"
for oneself at discrete moment t1 and then proceed to "follow" that law’s
selfsame content at t2 and at all subsequent times. But what if time were
conceived of dialectically as a dynamic river, á la Heraclitus,42 rather than
as an eternally strung string of selfsame beads, á la Parmenides?43 What if
historical moments flowed and swirled into one another rather than
remaining apart as hermetically sealed moments, separated from one
another on an otherwise indifferent timeline? If we think of law
dialectically, there is a sense in which it always "postpones the real work of
definition,"44 and despite the disapproving tone of these words in the
R3RUE’s commentary, it is probably a good thing that it does.
The concept of dialectics, though it has a complex philosophical
history, will be used quite simply and non-technically in this Article. I do
not intend to tell you about dialectics, but rather to adopt a dialectical point
of view to uncover an interesting and productive ambiguity in the R3RUE’s
treatment of a legally significant category, called "intent to charge," as it
appears in the substantive law of restitution dealing with unsolicited
benefits conferred in an emergency. Adorno’s definition of dialectics will
suffice to get us on our way: "The name dialectics says no more . . . than
39. Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630, 648–57 (1958).
40. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 63 (David Campbell
& Philip Thomas eds., 1997).
41. See Walter Benjamin, Critique of Violence, in REFLECTIONS: ESSAYS, APHORISMS,
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITINGS 277–300 (Peter Demetz ed., 1978) (providing an illustration
of this concept).
42. HERACLITUS, FRAGMENTS 55 (T.M. Robinson tr., 1987).
43. PARMENIDES, FRAGMENTS 55–91 (David Gallop tr. 1984).
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (2011).
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that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder [and]
that they come to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy."45 Even a
robot can learn to copy analytic categories.46 But only a human being is
capable of noticing that a legal concept, just like every abstraction, "does
not exhaust the thing conceived."47
"The determinable flow in every concept makes it necessary to cite
others."48 It will be the task of this Article to demonstrate that there is a
"determinable flow" in the concept of "intent to charge" that makes it
necessary to cite another concept—that of unjust enrichment itself—in
order to resolve the infinitely varied legal problems that can arise whenever
a case involving unsolicited benefits conferred in an emergency comes to
litigation. While the precise legal topic is narrow, my intent in examining it
could not be broader. My goal is to help resuscitate the idea that the word
"unjust" in unjust enrichment has a use in this area of the law which
transcends all possible statements about it that attempt to reduce it—as the
R3RUE’s commentary appears to do—to the status of a mere label for a
conclusion reached on other legal grounds.
The great legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart once said: "Particular factsituations do not await us already marked off from each other, and labelled
[sic] as instances of the general rule, the application of which is in question;
nor can the rule itself step forward to claim its own instances."49 To believe
otherwise is to commit the philosophical error of conflating an abstract
concept with the concrete particulars to which it is or may be applied. Such
an "identitarian" theory of law risks becoming pure ideology,50 for every
identifying judgment of the form "S is P" contains within it a non-identical
element. That this is logically intelligible to us stems from the observation
that "every single object subsumed under a class has definitions which are
not contained in the definitions of the class."51 And so, we shall see, do the
objects subsumed by those identifying judgments that apply the law of
restitution.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

THEODOR ADORNO, NEGATIVE DIALECTICS 5 (E.B. Ashton trans., 1973).
Id. at 29–30.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 53.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123 (1961).
ADORNO, supra note 45, at 148.
Id. at 150.
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III. The Location of Our Problem: Somewhere Between the Republic of
Restitution and Gift Island
"In an outline of the sources of civil liability," Professor Laycock
wrote, "the principal headings would be tort, contract, and restitution."52
For many years, I have made use of an extended geographical metaphor in
my classes on restitution to illustrate my own version of Laycock’s point. I
call this metaphor "The Geography of Restitution," and have even reduced
it to a crudely drawn map, as if the law of restitution lay at the very center
of a Middle Earth53 that is made up of several other sovereign heads of civil
liability that are historically and conceptually related to the "Republic of
Restitution" without being identical to it.

52. Laycock, supra note 9, at 1277. Professor Epstein has employed the metaphor of a
"fourth wheel" to describe the substantive law of restitution: "The common law coach runs
not on three substantive wheels [property, contracts and torts] but on four." Richard A.
Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1369, 1371 (1994).
53. J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE HISTORIES OF MIDDLE EARTH, vols. 1–5 (2003).
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On the map, the Kingdom of Contract, the Confederation of Torts, and
Fiduciaria are all connected, in one way or another, to the northernmost part
of the Republic of Restitution (Adjunctia Peninsula and Common County).
Here, the concept "unjust" in the phrase "unjust enrichment" derives its
meaning from some other body of law (contract, tort, or fiduciary duty),
and restitution merely supplies a set of optional alternative remedies to
claimants who do not, strictly speaking, need the substantive law of unjust
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enrichment to establish their claims.54 South of Remedy Marsh, however,
the lay of the land is quite different. Here, the legal remedies and equitable
remedies furnished by the law of restitution in Law County and Equity
County, respectively, are made available only to citizens of the city called
Unjust Enrichopolis. That is, in Unjust Enrichopolis, restitutionary
remedies are afforded only to claimants who can establish that the
defendant’s enrichment is unjust even though the defendant did not violate
a duty imposed on him by any other legal norm or principle exogenous to
the field of restitution.
As was previously mentioned, this Article concerns the meaning of
"unjust" as that word is used in the southern part of the Republic of
Restitution, after the "regime change," so to speak, that the shock and awe
campaign of the R3RUE brought about. Reduced from the status of a
"general guide for the conduct of the courts" in the First Restatement,55 the
concept of unjust enrichment in the R3RUE seems to have become a mere
label for a conclusion reached on other, purely legal, grounds.56 Described
in terms of the map, I intend to examine and measure the distance
separating the inhabitants of Unjust Enrichopolis, who are entitled to
restitution, from those of Gift Island (located in the middle of the Rightless
Sea), who are not.
The ultimate purpose of this Article is to raise awareness about the
meaning of the concept of unjust enrichment by focusing on a narrow but
well-defined class of cases in the substantive law of restitution. Think of
this as a jurisprudential case study, so to speak, of how the category intent
to charge is handled in the context of what Chapter 3, topic 1 of the R3RUE
calls "Emergency Intervention." Three specific provisions are involved:
Section 20 ("Protection Of Another’s Life Or Health"), Section 21
("Protection Of Another’s Property"), and Section 22 ("Performance Of
54. But cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (2011)
(applying substantive (and not just remedial) principles of unjust enrichment to the category
"Profit Derived from Opportunistic Breach (of Contract)"). The drafters were careful to say
that this section is a "limited exception" to the general rule, announced in Section 2(2), that
"[a] valid contract defines the obligations of the parties as to matters within its scope,
displacing to that extent any inquiry into unjust enrichment." Id. § 2 cmt. c.
55. FIRST RESTATEMENT introductory note, at 11.
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (2011).
Enrichment is unjust, in legal contemplation, to the extent it is without adequate
legal basis. . . . In no instance does the fact or extent of liability in restitution
depend on whether the source of that liability is conceived or described as unjust
enrichment, as unjustified enrichment, or as a combination of the two.
Id.
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Another’s Duty").57 In the situations covered by these rules, the claimant
has intentionally conferred an unquestionably valuable benefit on another in
the absence of any actual or supposed contract or request, and often without
the latter’s knowledge. Courts granting restitution in such cases do so as an
exception to the usual rule, which is itself rooted in a "long-standing
judicial reluctance to encourage one person to intervene in the affairs of
another by awarding restitution of benefits thereby conferred."58 In such
cases, courts often use the terms "volunteer" and "intermeddler" (and
sometimes even "officious intermeddler") to express their conclusion that
there is no recognized basis for treating the defendant’s enrichment as
unjust.59
There is only so much new ground that can be tilled by any committee
that undertakes to restate a legal field as vast as restitution, and on this
particular sub-topic, the R3RUE comes out pretty much the same way the
First Restatement did. Thus, the commentary to Section 2 of the new
Restatement says that it is "usually unacceptable" to confer a benefit and
then seek payment for its value in lieu of "proposing a bargain" to the
recipient.60 This reluctance to reward benefit-conferring volunteers can be
traced to a strong policy bias in our legal system in favor of encouraging the
formation of contract-based relationships: "Considerations of both justice
and efficiency require that private transfers be made pursuant to contract
whenever reasonably possible."61 Judge Posner describes the main reasons
for this policy preference in the following well-known passage, which the
new Restatement’s commentary quotes with approval:
One who voluntarily confers a benefit on another, which is to say in the
absence of a contractual obligation to do so, ordinarily has no legal
claim to be compensated. . . . If while you are sitting on your porch
sipping Margaritas a trio of itinerant musicians serenades you with
mandolin, lute, and hautboy, you have no obligation, in the absence of a
contract, to pay them for their performance no matter how much you
enjoyed it; and likewise if they were gardeners whom you had hired and
on a break from their gardening they took up their musical instruments
to serenade you. When voluntary transactions are feasible (in economic
parlance, when transaction costs are low), it is better and cheaper to
require the parties to make their own terms than for a court to try to fix
them—better and cheaper that the musicians should negotiate a price
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 20–22 (2011).
2 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 10.1, at 359 (1978).
Id. § 10.1, at 359–60.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 cmt. d (2011).
Id. § 2 cmt. c.
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with you in advance than for them to go running to court for a judicial
determination of the just price for their performance. 62

Section 2 of the R3RUE, entitled "Limiting Principles," takes steps to
codify this general judicial reluctance to make people pay for benefits they
did not request. First, it accentuates the plaintiff’s burden of proof in unjust
enrichment cases by announcing, in Section 2(1), that "[t]he fact that a
recipient has obtained a benefit without paying for it does not of itself
establish that the recipient has been unjustly enriched."63 Second, it
establishes in Section 2(2) that if there is a valid contract defining the
parties’ obligations, then, at least as to matters within its scope, the contract
will displace almost all judicial inquiry into the defaulting promisor’s unjust
enrichment.64 Third, it states in Section 2(3) that "[t]here is no liability in
restitution for an unrequested benefit voluntarily conferred, unless the
circumstances of the transaction justify the claimant’s intervention in the
absence of contract."65 And fourth, it declares in Section 2(4) that an
"innocent recipient" may not be subjected to a "forced exchange," which it
defines as "an obligation to pay for a benefit that the recipient should have
been free to refuse."66
The most critical provision of Section 2 for present purposes is subpart
three. Grammatically speaking, this text creates both a general rule and an
exception: There is no right to restitution for unrequested benefits
voluntarily conferred, unless. Unless what? The R3RUE recognizes, as
indeed it must, given the plethora of cases on point, that while it is
62. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reinsurance Results, Inc., 513 F.3d 652,
656–57 (7th Cir. 2008), quoted with approval in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION &
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2 reporter’s note a (2011).
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 2(1) (2011).
64. Id. § 2(2). Comment c to this section, which is entitled "Restitution subordinate to
contract," describes the law’s pro-contract bias in situations controlled by Section 2(2) as
follows:
Considerations of both justice and efficiency require that private transfers be
made pursuant to contract whenever reasonably possible, and that the parties’
own definition of their respective obligations—assuming the validity of their
agreement by all pertinent tests—take precedence over the obligations that the
law would impose in the absence of agreement. Restitution is accordingly
subordinate to contract as an organizing principle of private relationships, and
the terms of an enforceable agreement normally displace any claim of unjust
enrichment within their reach . . . subject to a limited exception in cases of
profitable and opportunistic breach of contract.
Id.
65. Id. § 2(3).
66. Id. § 2(4).
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"usually" unacceptable for a restitution claimant to confer a benefit and then
seek payment for its value without having first proposed a bargain, there are
exceptions:
There are cases in which a claimant may indeed recover compensation
for unrequested benefits intentionally conferred—because the claimant’s
intervention was justified under the circumstances, and because a
liability in restitution will not prejudice the recipient. Chapter 3 of this
Restatement constitutes a catalogue of instances in which such recovery
may be permitted.67

I do not intend to dwell in this Article on the doctrinal line dividing the
usual case, in which restitution is denied, from the special cases described
in Sections 20 through 22, where there is a presumption that restitution will
be granted. Instead, I mean to focus almost exclusively on the R3RUE’s
treatment of a particular subset of the cases governed by Sections 20
through 22. In this subset of cases, the claimant’s ability to recover in
restitution is said to depend solely on the question of his intent—whether he
had an intent to charge for his services at the time that he rendered them. In
short, I am concerned here with the cases covered by the "unless" clause of
Section 2(3). If, as that clause states, "the circumstances of the transaction
justify the claimant’s intervention in the absence of contract,"68 then it must
also be stated that the new Restatement gives the claimant both good news
and bad news. The good news is that you might recover in restitution for
the unsolicited benefit you have justifiably conferred on the defendant. The
bad news is that you will forfeit the right to recover if you acted without
having something called an intent to charge at the very time you acted.
Logically speaking, if the general rule is "No recovery for benefits
voluntarily conferred in the absence of contract," and the exceptions are
listed in Sections 20–22, then I will be concerned in this Article with an
exception to the exception—reversion to the general rule of non-recovery
where intent to charge is absent in cases that otherwise fall within the
exceptions.
IV. The Criteria for Having an "Intent to Charge"
The word "intent" comes from the Latin intentus, the past participle of
intendere, which originally signified the act of "stretching out" (tendere)
67.
68.

Id. § 2 cmt. d.
Id. § 2(3).
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towards something.69 Towards what kind of thing does the concept of
intent to charge stretch? Much like its common-law cousin contract, the
law of restitution has always distinguished between intention and the
manifestation of intention.70 Legally speaking, an "intention" is classified
as subjective: The word is supposed to refer to an actor’s state of mind.
Intention in this sense is equivalent to what the R3RUE calls "actual
intent,"71 and what the Restatement (Second) of Contracts calls "real
intention."72 A "manifestation of intention," on the other hand, is said to be
objective: The term refers to what the actor factually says and does within
a given social context, and has nothing to do with what may or may not be
going on inside his mind.73
While the so-called objective theory of contract tends to accord
primary juridical significance to the category of manifestation of intent in
constructing a person’s contractual rights and duties,74 the subjective
category of "intention" plays a much greater role in the sphere of restitution
law. For example, the First Restatement, in the course of discussing the
restitutionary implications of transfers made in anticipation of gratuity or
contract, states that a person’s manifestation of intent controls if what is
manifested is intent to create a contract or intent to confer a gift, but that
"[w]here a manifestation is ambiguous, the intent of the person conferring
the benefit to receive or not receive compensation controls."75 Thus, you
can lose a restitution case against someone on whom you conferred a
benefit that the other has requested when your manifestation of intention is
"ambiguous" and your actual intention was not to seek compensation.76
Alternatively, you can "manifest" a gratuitous intent in making a transfer of
69. "in-tent." Online Etymology Dictionary, DICTIONARY.COM. http://dictionary.
reference.com/browse/in-tent.
70. See, e.g., FIRST RESTATEMENT § 26 cmt. e & § 57 cmt. d.
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 11 cmt. b (2011).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981).
73. See id. § 2 cmt. b ("The phrase ‘manifestation of intention’ adopts an external or
objective standard for interpreting conduct; it means the external expression of intention as
distinguished from undisclosed intention.").
74. See, e.g., Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 522 (Va. 1954) (concluding promise
subjectively meant as a jest or bluff is nonetheless legally enforceable because the
promisor’s manifestation of intent was to enter into a contract and the promisee was unaware
of the jest).
75. FIRST RESTATEMENT § 57 cmt. d.
76. Id. § 57 cmt. d, illus. 8; cf. Bloomgarden v. Coyer, 479 F.2d 201, 212 (D.C. Cir.
1973) ("[I]n situations involving personal services, it has been variously stated that a duty to
pay will not be recognized where it is clear that the benefit was conferred gratuitously or
officiously.").
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money to someone, yet still recover in restitution if your unmanifested
actual intention was not gratuitous.77 Likewise, in Marvin v. Marvin, the
California Supreme Court held that someone involved in a relationship of
unmarried cohabitation might recover in restitution for the reasonable value
of household services rendered to his partner, less the reasonable value of
support received, "if he can show that he rendered services with the
expectation of monetary reward."78
The R3RUE carries forward the First Restatement’s distinction
between actual intent and manifested intent in a variety of different
contexts. Thus, for example, Comment b to Section 11, which deals with
the effect of mistakes in inter vivos gift transactions, states: "Where
conclusive evidence of the transferor’s actual intent is lacking, it will be
difficult to prove that a gratuitous transfer was in fact the result of a
mistake."79 Similarly, an illustration to Section 28, which involves benefits
conferred in the context of unmarried cohabitation between the parties,
makes the result depend, at least in part, on the court’s finding that the
services in question were "presumptively gratuitous."80 More to the point,
however, Comment c to Section 21 (entitled "Gratuitous Services")
unequivocally states: "There is no claim in restitution for services, however
valuable, that the provider has rendered without intent to charge."81
77. FIRST RESTATEMENT § 26 (3) ("A person who has transferred money to another
without intention to make a gift thereof may be entitled to restitution although at the time of
the transfer he manifested that the money was transferred as a gift."); see also Conkling’s
Estate v. Champlin, 141 P.2d 569, 571 (Okla. 1943) (concluding manifestation of intent to
make a gift does not control where other evidence shows "that in finality no gift was
intended").
78. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 106 (Cal. 1976). The R3RUE appears to accept
the Marvin court’s conclusion in cases involving services rendered by unmarried cohabitants
to their partners (§ 28 cmt. c), although it notes that "claims based purely on domestic
services are less likely to succeed" than claims based on "direct contributions" to the
defendant’s assets, such as "money, property, services or a combination thereof" (§ 28 cmt.
d). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 reporter’s
note a (2011) (explaining that the Marvin court’s decision to reject status-based entitlements
in cohabitation cases in favor of well-founded property claims based on contract or unjust
enrichment "is the current law of most U.S. jurisdictions").
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 11 cmt. b (2011)
(emphasis added).
80. Id. § 28 illus. 2 (2011). Compare Kellum v. Browning’s Adm’r, 231 S.W. 459,
463 (Ky. 1929) (illustrating the rebuttable "presumption of gratuity" where services are
rendered by someone who stands in a kinship or family relationship to the recipient), with
Sieger v. Sieger, 202 N.W. 742, 744 (Minn. 1925) (illustrating the rebuttable presumption
that husband’s transfer of purchase money to wife "was intended as a gift, settlement, or
advancement to the wife, and not as a resulting trust to the husband").
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 cmt. c (2011)
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When considered as legal rather than psychological categories, intent
to charge and gratuitous intent are what Hohfeld would have called "jural
opposites."82 To act with intent to charge is eo ipso to act without
gratuitous intent, and vice versa. The special case of performing another’s
duty to supply necessaries to a third person while having what the R3RUE
calls a "conditional donative intent,"83 though it is factually more
complicated than the case of supplying benefits directly to the defendant, is
no different. The R3RUE treats a claimant who intends that the immediate
recipient of a benefit not be charged, while at the same time intending that
the one who owes the recipient a legal duty be charged, as harboring two
separate pairs of juridically opposite intents: (1) a gratuitous intent (and
therefore no intent to charge) vis-à-vis the recipient, and (2) an intent to
charge (and therefore no gratuitous intent) vis-à-vis the defendant.84
In these and other situations, the R3RUE seems to distinguish a
person’s intent from his manifestation of intent on the model of what
Wittgenstein called the "inner and outer" (Inneres und Aüsseres).85 The law
treats the "outer," or objective, world of manifested intent as a public text,
so to speak, that fact-finders are capable of reading and interpreting if they
are given enough information about the relationship between the parties and
the conventional standards of meaning that the parties and their community
employ.86 The "inner," or subjective, world of intention, although
accessible in principle to the senses of no one but the actor, is treated as a
private text that nonetheless could have public consequences if the trier of
fact is given sufficient evidence of its existence.87 Thus, for example, the
R3RUE offers a pair of illustrations for its conclusion that, in property
salvage cases, the presence or absence inside the plaintiff of a nongratuitous subjective intent would make all the difference to recovery.88
Although "[t]here is no claim in restitution for services, however valuable,

(emphasis added).
82. WESLEY HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING 12 (David Campbell & Philip Thomas eds., 2001).
83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 22 cmt. d (2011).
84. Id. § 22 illus. 9.
85. 2 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY 63–63e
(C.G. Luckhardt & M.A.E. Aue trans., 1980) [hereinafter REMARKS].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 cmt. c, illus.
7–8 (2011).
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that the provider has rendered without intent to charge,"89 it says, the result
would be otherwise if the "trier of fact finds that [the plaintiff] did not act
gratuitously in preserving [defendant’s] property."90 In stating that "[t]he
relevant state of mind of the claimant is a question of fact,"91 the
commentary makes it clear that the distinction between inner and outer is
alive and well in the law of restitution, even if it is not completely clear
what kind of "fact" a state of mind is supposed to be.
Considered from a purely phenomenological perspective, it is no doubt
the case that "[a] person who intervenes in an emergency will rarely
consider, at the time of intervention, whether he should charge for his
services or seek reimbursement for his expenses."92 What, then, does the
R3RUE mean when it says, "The relevant state of mind of the claimant is a
question of fact"?93 A brief foray into Wittgenstein’s philosophy of
psychology will help us understand what this question is attempting to ask.
According to Wittgenstein, it is nonsensical to speak of private states
of mind such as "intent" (gratuitous or otherwise) as factual in the way that
material objects are factual—that is, on the model of an object and its
designation.94 When I speak to you about my intent, I am not typically
referring to something going on in my head, such as a brain process.95 The
sentence "I intend to eat the last cookie on the plate" is simply not the
equivalent of the sentence "A cookie-related neuron just fired in such-andsuch region of my left prefrontal cortex." Nor do people typically interpret
another’s statement of intent as a mere label for some sort of mental
occurrence or feeling that they cannot observe because it is hidden
somewhere deep inside the speaker.
Although intentions may be
accompanied by such mental occurrences or feelings, these are not the same
as the intentions they accompany.96 What is more, an intention, unlike a
state of consciousness, does not display what Wittgenstein calls "genuine

89. Id. § 21 cmt. c (2011).
90. Id. § 21 illus. 8 (2011).
91. Id. § 21 cmt. c (2011).
92. ROBERT GOFF & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 271 (1978).
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 cmt. c (2011).
94. WITTGENSTEIN, REMARKS, supra note 85, at 63.
95. See HANS-JOHANN GLOCK, A WITTGENSTEIN DICTIONARY 179 (1996) ("Mental or
physical processes or states are neither necessary nor sufficient for believing, intending or
meaning something.").
96. Id. at 180; LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 591, at 155e
(G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1953) [hereinafter PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS].
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duration."97 Thus, I can "have the intention of going away tomorrow"
without having this thought constantly, or even intermittently, on my mind
today.98 Finally, we would do well to remember that an actor’s description
or avowal of his intention can have consequences in the world, legal and
otherwise, that no mere unspoken mental occurrence could ever have.
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein demonstrates this last
point by means of an iconic example—his famous "beetle in a box."99
Although the immediate purpose of the example is to explode the idea that
the meaning of the word "pain" depends on some purely private inner
experience to which no one but the sufferer has access, the analysis is
equally (if not eerily) relevant to the case of intent to charge:
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own
case!—Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a
"beetle." No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he
knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle—Here it would be
quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One
might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.—But suppose the
word "beetle" had a use in these people’s language?—If so it would not
be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the
language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even
be empty.—No, one can "divide through" by the thing in the box; it
cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar
of the expression of sensation on the model of "object and designation"
the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.100

From a Wittgensteinean point of view, words that are used to describe
mental states acquire all of their familiarity and meaning from their "outer"
use in social life, according to publicly shared criteria, and not from some
private "inner" experience.101 This implies that a legally significant phrase
like intent to charge does not "stand for a family of mental and other
processes."102 Instead, we learn what a person’s subjective intent is in any
given case by interpreting three publicly observable criteria: (1) what the
person avows, (2) his explanation of what he intended, and (3) the context
in which he acts.103 Now, it would be quite wrong to conclude from all of
97. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ZETTEL § 45, at 10e (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von
Wrights eds., G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1970).
98. Id. § 46, at 10e.
99. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 96, § 293, at 100e
100. WITTGENSTEIN, REMARKS, supra note 85, § 293, at 100e.
101. Id.
102. WITTGENSTEIN, ZETTEL, supra note 97, § 26, at 6e.
103. See GLOCK, supra note 95, at 180.
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this that courts are playing a sort of crooked shell game with the word
"intent," and that underneath the shells of judicial rhetoric about subjective
or "actual" intention there is no pea. On the other hand, it would be equally
wrong to conclude that there is or must be such a subjective intent pea
hidden there, however invisible it may be to an outside observer. In short,
the model of "object and designation,"104 as Wittgenstein puts it, is simply
unhelpful for understanding what texts like the R3RUE are actually doing
when they use phrases such as intent to charge in a legally significant way.
Strictly speaking, the empirically existing world is not made up of
"facts." It primordially consists of raw reality itself—of that which keeps
on coming to the fore and then slipping away in that ever-refreshed present
moment we call "now." In law, as in daily life, a proposition of fact is a
human statement, made within the social context of a shared language,
about a portion or aspect of reality that has been noticed, selected and
organized according to some conscious or unconscious criterion. Thus, the
R3RUE’s confident assertion that intent to charge and "gratuitous intent"
refer to facts that must be determined by the trier of fact105 can only make
sense if the evidence for these legally significant subjective states of affairs
is public, or, if you will, "objective." Only publicly shared criteria for
applying the words intent to charge and gratuitous intent can give those
terms any legal significance in a real case. In short, the trier of fact, and
more generally the legal system itself, can only determine what a restitution
claimant subjectively intended in any given case by examining his words
(Objective Fact No. 1) and the social context in which he acted to confer
the benefit in question (Objective Fact No. 2).
Of course, all of this comes down to saying that these extra-mental
objective evidentiary facts are criteria for the presence of someone’s
subjective intent but not symptoms of it. It makes perfectly good sense to
talk about the symptoms of something if we have other criteria for
identifying and describing it.106 Pain, for example, can be a symptom of an
injury or disease because an x-ray or some other diagnostic tool can
uncover the pain’s source. But in the case of intent to charge, the only
means the law has of identifying and describing a person’s subjective intent
is to examine what he objectively said (then or now) and to look at the
104. Id.
105. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 illus. 8
(2011); see also Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. v. Hamil, 140 S.W. 951, 954 (Mo. App. 1911)
(noting the distinction between gratuitous intent and intent to charge is classified as a
"question of fact").
106. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS 24–25 (2d ed. 1960).
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objective context in which he acted. If there are hidden mental occurrences
to which the legal concept intent to charge somehow refers, then they
would "cancel out" in the public use of the words intent to charge in exactly
the same way that the contents of the box in Wittgenstein’s example were
cancelled out by the public use of the word "beetle."107
Which party bears the burden of proof on the issue of intent to charge
is, of course, a different and much more complicated question. It is a fair
generalization to say that the R3RUE combines both adherence and nonadherence to the case law, most of it rather old, on the question of
restitution in many emergency benefit situations in which the claimant had
an intention to charge. For example, after having displayed a small burst of
independence from tradition in a comment to an earlier draft,108 the final
version of Section 20 obediently follows the cases in holding that a
nonprofessional who acts to protect another’s life or health in an emergency
can never recover in restitution.109 However, who should bear the burden of
proof on the question of intent where it is relevant is not stated explicitly,
although there is plenty of authority for the proposition that professional
rescuers enjoy a rebuttable presumption that their services were rendered
with intent to charge.110
In cases involving the performance of another’s duty to supply
necessaries to a third person in the absence of the sort of emergency with
which we are dealing here, the First Restatement seems to make the
107. WITTGENSTEIN, REMARKS, supra note 85, at 63.
108. Comment b to Section 20 of Tentative Draft No. 2 asserted that "a claim in
restitution based on an emergency rescue by a nonprofessional would be entirely consistent
with the rule of this Section, in any case in which the court was satisfied (inter alia) that the
claimant had not acted gratuitously and that the benefit conferred was capable of valuation."
This language was deleted from the final, published version.
109. According to Kronman and Posner, the cases in the area appear to make "the
presumption of no intent to charge irrebuttable, with the result that the nonprofessional
rescuer is never entitled to a monetary award." ANTHONY KRONMAN & RICHARD POSNER,
THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 60 n.4 (1979). The drafters of the new restatement
acknowledge this point. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 20 cmt. b (2011) ("Emergency assistance rendered by nonprofessionals, however valuable,
does not give rise to a claim in restitution under existing law.").
110. See FREDERIC WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS § 201, at 314–15
(1913) (noting services of physicians and nurses "are generally rendered with the expectation
of compensation"); cf. Greenspan v. Slate, 97 A.2d 390, 390 (N.J. 1953) ("[A]s a physician
in practice of his profession he naturally intended to charge for his services."). The new
Restatement appears to accept this line of authority. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 20, cmt b, illus. 1–4 (2011) ("The present section
authorizes a claim in respect of ‘professional services,’ whether the claim is asserted by the
provider directly . . . or by a third party who pays for the services.").
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presence of gratuitous intent an affirmative defense.111 If necessaries are
supplied to a third person in an emergency, however, the First
Restatement’s blackletter explicitly makes the presence of intent to charge
an element of the claimant’s case in chief.112 The position of the R3RUE
on the burden of proof regarding intent to charge in cases of necessaries
supplied to third persons in either sort of situation is difficult to determine,
since the blackletter of Section 22, unlike that of Section 114 of the First
Restatement, does not mention intent to charge, relegating the issue to a
comment. One might plausibly think that the allocation of burden of proof
depends on how the category is described. If described in terms of the
presence of "intent to charge," then the burden is on the plaintiff. If
described in terms of the presence of "gratuitous intent," then the burden is
on the defendant. Unfortunately, the commentary has it both ways:
Referring to those who intervene "without the intention to seek
compensation or reimbursement," it states that "[p]ayment or other
performance rendered with the intention of making a gift will not support a
claim under this section."113
The R3RUE’s position on the burden of proving intent to charge in
cases of emergency property salvage is also unclear, though here the
drafters reject the most conservative interpretation of the leading cases,114
according to which the common law (unlike the law of salvage in
admiralty)115 raises an irrebuttable presumption against recovery for
services rendered in an emergency to save the defendant’s property from
imminent destruction.116 In Illustration 8 to Section 21, the R3RUE
111. FIRST RESTATEMENT § 113 cmt. e ("[I]n the absence of circumstances indicating an
intent to make a gift, it is inferred that a person supplying goods or rendering services
intends to charge therefor.").
112. Id. § 114(a).
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 22 cmt. d (2011).
114. See, e.g., Glenn v. Savage, 13 P. 442, 448 (Or. 1887) ("The law will never permit a
friendly act, or such as was intended to be an act of kindness or benevolence, to be
afterwards converted into a pecuniary demand."); Bartholomew v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 28
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) ("If a man humanely bestows his labor, and even risks his life, in
voluntarily aiding to preserve his neighbor’s house from destruction by fire, the law
considers the service rendered as gratuitous, and it, therefore, forms no ground of action.").
115. See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 8-1–14, at
532–78 (2d ed. 1975) (explaining what constitutes salvage, who may become salvors, and
how the courts compute and distribute the salvage award).
116. WOODWARD, supra note 110, § 207, at 326 ("The doctrine of salvage is peculiar to
admiralty law, the common law raises an irrebuttable presumption . . . that services rendered
in an emergency in the preservation of property, like emergency services [by
nonprofessionals] in the preservation of life, are gratuitous . . . ."). Professor Palmer rejects
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describes a case in which a claimant, B, who saves A’s property from an
approaching flood, is said to have a claim for restitution against A, but only
"[i]f the trier of fact finds that [B] did not act gratuitously in preserving
[A’s] property."117 The Reporter’s Note states that "Illustration 9 accepts
the judgment of the trial court that was rejected on appeal in Bartholomew
v. Jackson,"118 though contrary to the First Restatement, it does not say or
suggest who bears the burden of proof on the question of gratuitous
intent.119
At the end of the day, however, the question of which party should
bear the burden of proof on the issue of intent to charge is a matter of law
and policy that can be safely ignored in the context of the present study.120
However interesting or important it may be, answering this question is
simply immaterial to my goal, which is to investigate the jurisprudential
significance of the sheer existence of the legal category intent to charge in
the substantive law of restitution. What is most significant for present
purposes is that the R3RUE advances the view that there can and should be
recovery in restitution in cases of this sort if either intent to charge or no
Woodward’s view that the presumption of gratuity in these cases should be irrebuttable,
stating that "[t]he issue is properly one of fact, to be proved in the usual way." PALMER,
supra note 58, § 10.3, at 370. Keener, too, criticizes the idea that emergency property
salvors could never recover for their services, even "if it can be shown that [they] intended to
receive compensation for the services rendered." KEENER, supra note 13, at 356 (conceding
that in such cases "the right of recovery is denied by the weight of authority").
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 illus. 7
(2011).
118. Id. § 21 reporter’s note c.
119. Section 117 of the First Restatement provides that a property salvor is entitled to
restitution if five specific conditions are satisfied, including the condition stated in Section
117(d) that the person seeking restitution "intended to charge for such services or to retain
the things as his own if the identity of the owner were not discovered or if the owner should
disclaim." FIRST RESTATEMENT § 117(d). This arrangement implies that the person seeking
restitution bears the burden of proof on the issue, since it is listed as a condition of his ability
to recover. The blackletter of Section 21 of the R3RUE lists only two conditions, neither of
which mentions with the issue of intent to charge. Instead, the drafters deal with the issue of
intent in Comment c and illustrations 7 and 8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION &
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 illus. 7–8 (2011).
120. On the law-and-policy implications of burden of proof, Goff and Jones cite Roman
law for what they call the "appealing" proposition that "the onus should be on the defendant
to demonstrate that the stranger intended to render his services gratuitously" in property
rescue cases, because most people are too busy to think explicitly about their motivations in
emergencies; therefore, they say, to place the burden on the claimant would be
"unnecessarily severe," given that substantial social benefits accrue from encouraging people
to save valuable property that would otherwise be destroyed. GOFF & JONES, supra note 92,
at 271.
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gratuitous intent can be demonstrated as a matter of fact. Regardless of
who must do the demonstrating, the new Restatement’s legal premise that
intent to charge is some kind of fact in the first place is all that matters here.
V. A Thought Experiment to Test the Third Restatement’s Preference for
the Concept of Unjustified Enrichment
The time is now ripe to propose a modest thought experiment.
According to the well-settled law of restitution, "[a] person manifests that
he does not expect compensation for a benefit which he confers upon
another if a reasonable person would so believe from what the transferor
says or does."121 Now let this context-specific manifestation of an intent
that is gratuitous be absolutely reversed: Let the claimant objectively
manifest an intention to charge for everything he does that benefits
someone else. In particular, imagine that some (or many) people were to
execute the following document and then take aggressive steps to
disseminate it, as widely as possible, by such means as giving copies to all
their friends and acquaintances, publishing it in the legal notices section of
the local newspaper, posting it prominently on their Facebook pages,
reciting it out loud to their spouses or partners each and every morning at
the breakfast table, and so forth:

121.

FIRST RESTATEMENT § 57 cmt. a (emphasis added).
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General Declaration of Intent to Charge for Benefits Conferred
I make this declaration to enact my sincere and irreversible choice to opt
out of all social and legal conventions in which the law of restitution and
unjust enrichment creates a rebuttable presumption that my benefit-conferring
actions have been performed with gratuitous intent solely by virtue of the
objective context in which they are performed. I mean this declaration to
apply to every non-contractual transfer of benefits by me to someone else that
may occur now and in the future, with one and only one exception: Those
cases in which my actions are accompanied by a subjective intent-in-fact to
confer a gift that is provable by specific evidence that the thought "I intend
this to be a gift" was literally present in my consciousness in the form of a
mental image at the time of my actions. Therefore, with the exception of my
contractual relations, whether express or implied-in-fact (wherein the terms of
said contracts will control my rights and obligations) I hereby solemnly
declare that I do now intend, and for the rest of my life always will intend, to
charge and hold accountable for payment any and all persons who receive
benefits from me (in whatever form) as a result of my actions or inactions, no
matter how "altruistic" or "gratuitous" they may seem to be to the recipient or
to an outside observer. I intend the amount of the charges to be determined by
the rules and principles which govern the measurement of benefits under the
law of restitution.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on_________________, at________________________
________________________ ________________________
Declarant
Witness
[Unsworn declaration under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746]

I realize that waving a declaration like this around town is probably
not the best way to "win friends and influence people," as Dale Carnegie
famously put it.122 I can even imagine palimony-averse individuals like Lee
Marvin beginning to cringe at the prospect of their live-in partners trying to
put them on notice that the free ride is over when it comes to the way the
law treats the economic value of household services.123 But, in truth, the
122. DALE CARNEGIE, HOW TO WIN FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE (1936).
123. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 123 (Cal. 1976) (establishing the possibility
of a restitution award for domestic services in cohabitation cases if the claimant "can show
that he rendered services with the expectation of monetary reward"). The Marvin court also
said that the value of the plaintiff’s services in the event he could prove he expected a
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real point of my thought experiment is not to assess its practical wisdom, or
even to evaluate its feasibility as a legal strategy for greedy rescuers or
needy cohabitants. I am also not interested in addressing the normative
question of what a court should do with one of these declarations if ever it
were offered into evidence in a real case.
The ultimate purpose of the thought experiment is jurisprudential and
philosophical rather than narrowly "legal." At the most general level, the
point I want to make with the Declaration of Intent to Charge for Benefits
Conferred is actually quite simple: In order to remain real, legal concepts,
like all concepts, must be ceaselessly replenished by the appearance of the
concrete particulars that they aspire to govern. Only hitherto unassimilated
particulars can give the concepts employed in the law of restitution their
proper weight, and, more importantly, can prevent the legal system from
depreciating the very idea of reality itself into a farce. It seems to me that
this inherently dialectical relationship between the abstract and the
particular lies at the core of Professor Palmer’s insight that "[u]njust
enrichment is an indefinable idea in the same way that justice is
indefinable," and shows why "[t]his wide and imprecise idea has played a
creative role in the development of an important branch of modern law."124
The Declaration of Intent to Charge for Benefits Conferred attempts to
opt out of the usual default rule in restitution cases involving emergency
benefits. A default rule is not an unbending legal command—it is what the
law will assume to be the case in the absence of evidence to the contrary.125
In the law of restitution involving benefits conferred in an emergency, the
general default rule is clear: "[T]he courts are disposed to assume that the
claimant’s effort was inspired by altruism or benevolence."126 It will come
as no surprise to learn that the prevailing law-and-economics view of the
subject attempts to justify this assumption on efficiency grounds. For
example, in one oft-cited article, Landes and Posner have this to say about
what they call the problem of "altruistic versus compensated rescue":
Since the enforcement of a legal claim for compensation is costly even if
the claim is settled rather than litigated, we predict that a legal system
concerned with maximizing efficiency would refuse to grant
monetary award would be offset by "the reasonable value of support received" from the
defendant. Id. at 122–23. When the case was retried, it was found that these two numbers
offset one another, with the result that at the end of the process the plaintiff recovered
exactly nothing. See Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
124. 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 5 (1978).
125. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.1 (4th ed. 2004).
126. SECOND RESTATEMENT § 3 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983).
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compensation in rescue situations where altruism provided a strong
inducement to rescue attempts. . . . A legal rule entitling the rescuer to
compensation in these situations would be inefficient because it would
substitute a costly legal transaction for a costless altruistic exchange.127

Although Landes and Posner have undoubtedly provided lawyers and
judges with a nuanced microeconomic study of the welfare effects of the
substantive law of unjust enrichment in several different emergency benefit
situations, it must also be said that their analysis rests on motivational
premises that are sociologically static. That is, they unreflectively
naturalize the social distribution of altruistic and self-interested motives in
their models, in much the same way that Rousseau naturalized them in the
eighteenth century.128 These authors merely assume that altruism provides
"a strong inducement to rescue" in certain types of situations, presumably
because they believe that many or most people have, in fact, acted
altruistically in such situations in the past. Courts, too, tend to naturalize
the social distribution of altruism and self-interest, as the following passage
from a well-known nineteenth-century decision, Hertzog v. Hertzog, will
demonstrate:
Thus if a man is found to have done work for another, and there appears
no known relation between them that accounts for such service, the law
presumes a contract of hiring. But if a man’s house takes fire, the law
does not presume or imply a contract to pay his neighbors for their
services in saving his property. The common principles of human
conduct mark self-interest as the motive of action in the one case, and
kindness in the other; and therefore, by common custom, compensation
is mutually counted on in one case, and in the other not. 129

The sort of analysis that is employed by Landes and Posner and in the
Hertzog decision presupposes that what most people have tended to do
heretofore in certain types of situations is what they will always continue to
127. William Landes & Richard Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other
Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 95 (1978).
128. See A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE DISCOURSES 31, at 46–47 (G.D.H. Cole tr., 1973).
Throwing aside . . . all those scientific books, which teach us only to see men
such as they have made themselves, and contemplating the first and most simple
operation of the human soul, I think I can perceive in it two principles prior to
reason, one of them deeply interested in our own welfare and preservation, and
the other exciting a natural repugnance at seeing any other sensible being, and
particularly any of our own species, suffer pain or death.
Id.
129. Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465, 465 (1857).
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do. But history shows that social and individual arrangements can and do
change, and that what an earlier age took to be "natural" a later age might
recognize as "unnatural" (i.e., socially constructed). It is therefore
unnecessary to decide whether Professor Palmer was right to call Landes
and Posner’s article "[a]n unpersuasive attempt . . . to provide an economic
analysis of the problems" involved in emergency property and life
rescues.130 For my Declaration of Intent to Charge for Benefits Conferred
seeks neither to change nor to justify any rule of the common law. Instead,
it exploits the law’s default rules by exhibiting the possible emergence of
no less than a new type of human being.
In particular, the declaration foreshadows the appearance of someone
who has chosen to gird his loins for uncompromising competitive struggle
in the twenty-first century global marketplace, in a manner that coldly
accepts Heidegger’s depressing diagnosis that modern technology has
transformed the entire world into a "standing reserve" (Bestand) full of
human and natural resources whose only purpose and function is to be
exploited.131 The kind of person who would sign a declaration like this
would be engaging in a particularly perverse form of what Foucault has
called "the government of self."132 Such a person would have chosen to
transform herself into a homo economicus from top to bottom—a moneygrubbing economic creature in virtually all of her interactions with others.
The idea of declaring under penalty of perjury that the prospect of a
cash reward, not altruism or benevolence, will always be the mainspring of
your actions unless you explicitly (and provably) choose to act altruistically
in this or that particular situation is not merely a direct refutation of the
courts’ usual default rule in substantive restitution cases. My thought
experiment also represents a radical but logical extension of Adam Smith’s
remark that "[n]obody but a beggar chuses [sic] to depend chiefly upon the
benevolence of his fellow-citizens."133 One might even say that it invites
human beings to enter into what Ayn Rand famously called a "utopia of
greed."134 Since its very existence is made possible by the way the
doctrinal categories of the R3RUE treat the concept of intent to charge, I
130.
131.

GEORGE PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 923 (Cumulative Supp. No. 4, 2010).
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER
ESSAYS 17 (William Lovitt trans., 1977).
132. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE GOVERNMENT OF SELF AND OTHERS: LECTURES AT THE
COLLÈGE DE FRANCE 1982–83 (Frèdèric Gros ed. & Graham Burchell trans., 2010).
133. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 14 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937).
134. AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED 752 (1999).

INTENT TO CHARGE

943

believe that it constitutes an excellent test of the drafters’ expressed desire
to equate, without leaving any remainder, the concepts of unjust enrichment
and legally unjustified enrichment.135
From the point of view of basic legal theory, the formal relation
between the categories "intention" and "manifestation of intention" in the
law of restitution is the same as the relation between a question of fact and
a mixed question of law and fact. The legal system determines a party’s
manifestation of intention by looking at what he said and did in a certain
context (facts) from the point of view of what a "reasonable person" (a legal
construct) would have taken the facts to signify.136 As a mixed question of
law and fact, the task of determining a party’s manifestation of intention is
therefore explicitly interpretive: It requires the decision maker to apply the
legal norm of a "reasonable person" to the facts and then reach a normative
conclusion that either grants or denies recovery. On the other hand, the
R3RUE treats the category of a party’s subjective intent to charge as raising
a pure question of fact, uncontaminated by any need for legal
interpretation.137 Either the claimant intended to charge for the benefits he
conferred on the defendant or he did not: No question of the normative
reasonableness or justice of his intention seems to be involved.
As we have already seen, however, resolving the "factuality" of a
person’s state of mind on this issue depends exclusively on the very same
kinds of objective evidence that are examined when a manifestation of
intention is involved—evidence of what the claimant said and did in a given
context. But, whereas in the case of a manifestation of intent the trier of
fact is allowed and required to apply an explicitly normative concept (what
a "reasonable person" would have understood the facts to mean), in the case
of a subjective intention, the R3RUE provides for no normative component
in the process of fact-finding. Indeed, Comment b to Section 1 appears to
rule out a priori any assessment of the one normative criterion that would
be of most assistance, I submit, in resolving the case presented by my
thought experiment. I am referring, of course, to the justice of plaintiff’s
case—to the justice of a case that depends on a court accepting the
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. b (2011).
136. See, e.g., FIRST RESTATEMENT § 57 cmt. a ("A person manifests that he does not
expect compensation for a benefit which he confers upon another if a reasonable person
would so believe from what the transferor says or does.").
137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 21 cmt. c
(2011) ("There is no claim in restitution for services, however valuable, that the provider has
rendered without intent to charge. The relevant state of mind of the claimant is a question of
fact.").
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normative premise that this declaration embodies so aggressively—one that
goes against the grain of a century and a half of case law.
To summarize all of this in the form of a rhetorical question: How can
the concept of legally unjustified enrichment eclipse any independent role
for the concept of unjust enrichment if what is legally unjustified depends
for its determination on a "fact" that cannot be determined without engaging
in at least some sort of normative interpretation?
Professor Levmore has expressed the normative premise of the cases
in this area as follows: "[O]ne may explain that the law’s treatment of
volunteers reflects a moral consensus, real or wishful, that extremely good
and bad deeds are unlikely to be influenced by or simply should not be
regulated by economic incentives."138 The moral rhetoric displayed in the
Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Glenn v. Savage illustrates Levmore’s
point rather nicely:
The law will never permit a friendly act, or such as was intended to be
an act of kindness or benevolence, to be afterwards converted into a
pecuniary demand. It would be doing violence to some of the kindest
and best effusions of the heart, to suffer them afterwards to be perverted
by sordid avarice. Whatever differences may arise afterwards among
men, let those meritorious and generous acts remain lasting monuments
of the good offices, intended in the days of good neighborhood and
friendship; and let no after-circumstances ever tarnish or obliterate them
from the recollection of the parties.139

Texts such as this exhibit a clear ideological commitment to the muchdeconstructed and much-criticized distinction between private and public
spheres, on which most of the common law of contract, tort and restitution
is based.140 What we can see in the R3RUE’s treatment of intent to charge
is a weakening of the line of demarcation between public and private that
earlier case law established. By supporting recovery in emergency benefit
situations in which there is an intention to charge, the R3RUE lifts the veil
separating the private sphere, where it is said that subjective altruism
normally rules in emergency situations, and the public sphere, where the
rigorous objectivity of the commodity form and contract are said to be the
prevailing norms for social organization. The Declaration of Intent to
Charge for Benefits Conferred goes even further; it rips off the veil
completely. In doing so, it gives us the opportunity to consider whether
138.
139.
140.

Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 103 (1985).
Glenn v. Savage, 13 P. 442, 448 (Or. 1887).
See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 253–57 (1987).
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there is or should be any independent role for the principle of "unjust
enrichment" in the law of restitution.
VI. Conclusion
Legal concepts classify facts in the way socket wrenches turn nuts and
bolts: Both instruments are premade to accommodate only certain types of
other premade objects. Every practicing lawyer knows that what the law
calls "the facts" are not just out there, in the world, waiting to be picked up
like a nugget of gold on the ground. Facts are selected and crafted by
human beings out of something that precedes them in reality, something
messily particular that always leaves an unclassified remainder when
pressed into the procrustean bed of a juridical statement that formally
relates "the facts" to "the law."141 The relationship between an abstract
legal concept and the particular situation that confronts it on any given
occasion is therefore fundamentally different than the relationship between
the law and the facts of a case. The word "particular" gestures at something
that has yet to be subdued in the form of any sort of statement—something
that might very well surprise us and cause us to rethink the standard
conceptions we have hitherto used to organize and express our
experiences.142 To ignore the continuing emergence of the particular in
reality in favor of a single-minded quest to subsume premade facts into
premade concepts is to engage in what Theodor Adorno called "peephole
metaphysics."143 A legal system afflicted by unwavering attachment to this
sort of metaphysics is inherently sclerotic: It could never bring itself to
respond sensitively to changes in the world around it.
Consider what Roberto Unger has to say, from the left, about the role
of imagination in the study and practice of law:
Our interests and ideals remain nailed to the cross of our arrangements.
We cannot realize our interests and ideals more fully, nor redefine them
more deeply, until we have learned to remake and to reimagine our
arrangements more freely. History will not give us this freedom. We
must win it in the here and now of legal detail, economic constraint, and
deadening preconception. We shall not win it if we continue to profess
a science of society reducing the possible to the actual and a discourse
141. Cf. E.A. FARNSWORTH & W. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 871
n. b (3d ed. 1980) (discussing courts’ "attempts to squeeze a quasi-contractual duty into the
Procrustean bed of contract").
142. Cf. ADORNO, supra note 45, at 172.
143. Id. at 138.
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about law anointing power with piety. It is true that we cannot be
visionaries until we become realists. It is also true that to become
realists we must make ourselves into visionaries.144

Now consider what Richard Epstein says, from the right, about human
nature:
The key question is why rules governing private property (by which I
include those dealing with property, contract, and tort) enjoy such great
temporal durability in the common law. And the answer is that they
depend upon assumptions that hold across a wide range of
circumstances and cases. There are certain permanent features of the
human condition that are not dependent on technology or on the
peculiarities of time and circumstance. It is to these permanent features
of the human condition that any sound legal system must respond. Two
conditions come instantly to central stage. First, the scarcity of
resources is a constant condition for all societies at all times, no matter
how they are organized. . . . Second, the widespread, if not universal,
presence of self-interest necessarily follows. Any individual who
practices a form of voluntary and unreciprocated altruism will have
fewer resources at his command than one who follows the dictates of
self-interest.145

One might say that the thought experiment put forward in this Article
represents a synthesis of the otherwise antithetical sociopolitical points of
view expressed in these two passages. On the one hand, the Declaration of
Intent to Charge for Benefits Conferred is clearly a radical attempt to
"reimagine our arrangements more freely,"146 as Unger puts it, although I
have no doubt that Unger himself would be personally horrified by the
direction taken by this particular form of reimagining. But on the other
hand, the declaration also seems to be but a simple logical extension of
Epstein’s claim that "[a]ny individual who practices a form of voluntary
and unreciprocated altruism will have fewer resources at his command than
one who follows the dictates of self-interest," and that the immutably paired
social conditions of economic scarcity and individual self-interest both
inform and ought to inform how the law is written and applied.147
However, the foregoing synthesis has a purpose that transcends all
debates about legal policy in the particular segment of restitution law to
which it applies. Legal decisions are more than just official records of the
144. ROBERTO UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 189–90 (1996).
145. Richard A. Epstein, All Quiet on the Eastern Front, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 559–
60 (1991) (emphasis added).
146. UNGER, supra note 144, at 189.
147. See Epstein, supra note 145, at 559–60.
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public resolution of private disputes according to well-settled legal rules
and principles. They are also more than venues in which the government
officials called "judges" work out the best possible interpretation of our past
legal institutions and practices,148 or discover and announce those legal
rules that best promise to make society better off in the future.149 That a
legal decision can be portrayed and analyzed as if it were exclusively some
of these things, or even all of them at once, almost goes without saying, as
many generations of law students would be able to attest. But certainly that
is not all there is to law or even a restatement of the law. Legal decisions
are also cultural artifacts in the way that ancient tools or cave paintings are
cultural artifacts. Whatever the specific purpose of their creator may have
been, they also communicate something about the form of life
(Lebensform), to borrow Wittgenstein’s phrase, that produced them.150
If this Article has accomplished its primary purpose, then, it will have
revealed something significant about the rather petrified sociolegal form of
life that is imagined by the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust
Enrichment.

148. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
149. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (7th ed. 2007).
150. WITTGENSTEIN, REMARKS, supra note 85, § 19, at 8e ("[T]o imagine a language is
to imagine a form of life.").

